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Abstract. Cyber attacks are becoming increasingly complex, practi-
cally sophisticated and organized. Losses due to such attacks are im-
portant, varying from the loss of money to business reputation spoilage.
Therefore, there is a great need for potential victims of cyber attacks
to deploy security solutions that allow the identification and/or predic-
tion of potential cyber attacks, and deploy defenses to face them. In this
paper, we propose a framework that incorporates Attack-Defense trees
(ADTrees) and Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMCs) to system-
atically represent attacks, defenses, and their interaction. This solution
allows to perform quantitative security assessment, with an aim to pre-
dict and/or identify attacks and find the best and appropriate defenses
to reduce the impact of attacks.
Keywords: Attack–Defense Trees, Markov chains, Security modeling,
Quantitative analysis.
1 Introduction
Cyber attacks are becoming more and more technically sophisticated, and well
organized. Losses due to such attacks are important, varying from the loss of
money to business reputation spoilage. On the other side of the coin, in order
to fend and stop this destructive cyber attacks wave, research efforts on cy-
ber attacks and security have considerably risen, trying to come with the best
solutions that allow security engineers to predict cyber attacks, estimate their
likelihood, and find the most feasible defenses to prevent or reduce the negative
impact of these cyber attacks. As a consequence of these research efforts, a great
number of graphical models have been proposed in the last two decades (e.g.,
attack trees [14], attack graphs [7], attack-countermeasure trees [17], and attack-
defense trees [10]) and have been widely used for cyber security modeling and
assessment. In spite of their similarities, these models differ on how to model
attacks and defenses, and how to integrate aspects like time, and dependencies
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between actions within the model. The perfect model should be easy to use, and
practically implementable. It should provide a user-friendly and comprehensive
representation of real-life security scenarios, and should integrate aspects like
time and dependencies as well as security assessment functions. These require-
ments are well defined by the ADTrees model [10], which extends attack trees [14]
with refinable defenses, and allows the representation of sequential dependencies
between actions. It also supports security assessments of attributes such as the
likelihood, the cost, and/or the efficiency of attacks/defenses.
ADTrees are defined as a graphical methodology used to represent security
scenarios by systematically representing the different actions that an attacker
may undertake to realize a security goal, and the different actions that a defender
may apply to stop the attacker’s actions from being realized. It comes with a
strong formal framework for reasoning about security scenarios through different
types of semantics (propositional, multiset, De Morgan lattice, and equational),
and has proven to be simple, easy to use, and yet powerful in its modeling
capability. It has been validated in a large industrial case study [4].
To perform quantitative security assessment for evaluating attributes like
cost, efficiency, time, and probabilities, ADTrees apply a bottom-up procedure [14].
Unfortunately this procedure can only be used for attribute evaluation under
the assumption that all considered actions (attacks/defenses) are independent.
This is a very strong assumption which is unrealistic in practice, since actions
are usually dependent, or in the simplest case sequentially dependent. To over-
come this limitation, we propose a new approach for security assessment of
ADTrees involving dependencies between actions. This approach relies on Con-
tinuous Time Markov Chains. Being a powerful model, provided with a useful
quantitative analysis approach, CTMCs tend to be the perfect candidate to as-
sess ADTrees involving dependencies. Inspired by authors of [1–3, 12, 15], we
model atomic attacks/defenses using an exponential distribution. In fact, expo-
nential distribution seems to be a suitable distribution to model a great number
of attacks/defenses like brute force attacks, adaptive defense mechanisms (e.g.,
moving target defenses), or countermeasures with delayed impacts like policies
execution. In this paper, we propose a framework that combines the graphi-
cal and formal methodology of ADTrees with CTMCs, and allows performing
a system’s security assessment. The framework takes as an input an ADTree
representing a security scenario, and transforms it into a CTMC. This CTMC is
then used to perform the security assessment through the evaluation of security
attributes such as likelihood, the mean time required by an attack scenario, and
other attributes that security engineers may define. To achieve this, we define a
new semantics for ADTrees in terms of CTMCs. These semantics express how
to translate attacks/defenses into individual CTMCs and how to combine these
individual CTMCs into one final CTMC representing the entire ADTree.
Related work. Over the last two decades, a number of graphical security models
(e.g., attack trees [14], attack graphs [7], and attack-countermeasure trees [17])
have been proposed in the literature and have been widely used for cyber security
modeling and assessment. Moreover, due to the development of cyber attacks in
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terms of techniques, dependencies, and organization, these models have been
enriched and elevated in order to correctly model and assess sophisticated cy-
ber attacks. For instance, attack trees have been enriched and augmented with
adaptable countermeasures to become ADTrees [10]. Performing quantitative
analysis on these models usually goes through applying an analytic approach
such as Markov chains [1–3,12,15], Petri-Nets [5,16], or Bayesian networks [11].
The choice of the analytical approach depends mainly on the model itself, the
aspects (time, dependencies) that it considers, and the user preference toward
the approach. We find that the Markov chains approach has mostly been chosen
for assessing these models. For instance, they have been applied in [2, 3, 15] on
attack trees, and in [1, 12] on attack graphs to perform quantitative analysis,
and have shown their easy and useful applicability. Inspired by the previous
works, we have chosen to apply the Markov chains approach on ADTrees for
the following reasons: Models used in the previously cited works like attack
trees [2, 3, 5, 15, 16], and attack graphs [1, 12] do not define the modeling of
defenses in their specification.
Although defense specification is not present in those models, some au-
thors [1–3,5,12,15,16] tried to incorporate defenses to model security scenarios.
Unfortunately, they have assumed that the defenses can totally, with no delay,
mitigate a given attack. In other words, an attack node is simply deleted from
the attack model when it is counter-defended. This assumption is too strong
since it is not always the case for a defense to immediately stop an attack once
the defense is set up. In fact, there exist defenses whose impact comes after a
certain delay like a password changing policy. The ADTree model overcomes the
limitation of modeling defense by nature, as it allows to model and represent de-
fenses of different types independent of their impact delay. Secondly, compared
to attack-countermeasure trees model, an ADTree model allows the refinement
of defenses, which is more realistic. Kordy el al. [11] adopted ADTrees model and
used Bayesian networks approach to assess the likelihood of security scenarios.
This approach requires for each instant of time the construction of a conditional
probability table for each action because of the stochastic dependency between
actions. This requirement can be time consuming, error prone, and not prac-
tical when a large ADTree is evaluated. Thanks to CTMCs, we can represent
the same information (conditional probability tables) using a temporal probabil-
ity function known as CDF (Cumulative Distribution Function). This function
is associated to each action, and provides for each given instant of time t the
probability of occurrence of the action with respect to its dependencies.
Contributions. To summarize, the contributions of this paper are threefold.
– We define a new semantics of ADTree model in terms of CTMCs. The se-
mantics express the way attacks/defense action must be represented as a
CTMC, and how different CTMCs can be composed to represent the entire
attack-defense tree.
– We use the composed CTMC that represents the attack-defense scenario to
perform quantitative analysis. Given that attack trees are formally a sub-
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class of attack-defense trees, our analysis technique also applies to attack
trees.
– We demonstrate the applicability of our solution using a simple but realistic
example study.
Organization. Section 2 presents the basics of the attack-defense tree model
and CTMC model. Section 3 defines our semantics for attack-defense trees in
terms of CTMCs. Section 4 discusses the analytical approach of CTMCs to per-
form quantitative security assessment. Section 5 performs quantitative analysis
on an example study. Finally, Section 6 provides conclusions and perspectives.
2 ADTrees and CTMCs
2.1 ADTrees
ADTrees are a graphical methodology used to represent security scenarios. They
can be seen as a two-player game. The first player is qualified by proponent
‘p′, and the second by opponent ‘o′ [9]. Depending on the root of the attack-
defense tree, if the root is an attack, then the proponent is the attacker, else
it is the defender. Graphically, each performed action or accomplished sub-goal
is represented by a node depicted by a red circle (©) if it refers to an attack
action/subgoal, or by a green square () if it refers to a defense action/subgoal.
Any node of either type in an ADTree can be refined (either disjunctively, con-
junctively, or sequentially conjunctive), or countered by another node of the
opposite type. Nodes that cannot be refined any further are qualified by basic
actions. When a node is disjunctively refined, its accomplishment requires at
least one of its refinement nodes to be accomplished. A conjunctively refined
node requires all its refinement nodes to be realized without any prefixed order.
The sequential conjunctive refinement is similar to the latter but requires a pre-
defined accomplishment order for its refinement nodes. We depict a conjunctive
refinement of a node by an arc over all edges connecting the node and its re-
finement nodes, and the sequentially conjunctive refinement with a directed arc.
When a node is countered with another node of opposite type, they are linked
together using a dashed line.
Figure 1 illustrates an ADTree for a simple networked system where the at-
tacker wants to compromise a server host by executing malicious scripts. To
achieve his goal, the attacker must first perform reconnaissance in order to
gain knowledge about the network’s assets (e.g., topology, protocols, addresses,
open ports) using some tools like Nmap. On the other side, to prevent the at-
tacker from gaining knowledge on the network, the defender can apply one of
the two adaptive defenses. The first defense regularly changes IP addresses of
network hosts and the second defense ‘Mutable network’ dynamically shuﬄes
IP addresses, routing tables and topology of the network. In the second step,
the attacker looks for any vulnerabilities using Nesus for instance. Then, using
Metasploit for example, he exploits the discovered vulnerability, and executes a
specific designed payload to gain high privileges on the target host. To fend this,
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Fig. 1. An example ADTree representing the security scenario
the defender frequently performs penetration tests to discover vulnerabilities and
develop appropriate patches. As an alternative to target exploitation through
vulnerabilities, the attack can brute force the root’s password to gain the priv-
ilege. The defender implements in this case a policy to periodically change the
passwords. This will delay the attacker from succeeding his goal. Finally, if the
attacker manage to escalate the privileges, he can execute malicious command
and cause harm to the server.
Given that this multi-step attack must be performed in a particular order,
we use a sequential conjunction refinement. To realize the ‘Escalate Privilege’
attack, the attacker must either successfully brute force the root password or
(disjunction refinement) exploit a discovered vulnerability and (conjunction re-
finement) running its dedicated Exploit and payload program.
2.2 Formal definition of ADTrees
Formally, ADTrees are defined by means of an abstract syntax called ADTerms [10].
The ADTerms in this paper are typed over the signature Σ = (S,F), where:
– S = {p, o} is the set of types (proponent p and opponent o)
– F = {(∨pk)k∈N, (∧pk)k∈N, (−→∧ pk)k∈N, (∨ok)k∈N, (∧ok)k∈N, (−→∧ ok)k∈N, cp, co}∪Bp∪Bo
is a set of function symbols.
The unranked functions (∨sk)k∈N, (∧sk)k∈N and (−→∧ sk)k∈N, where s ∈ S, represent
the disjunctive (∨), conjunctive (∧), and sequential conjunction (−→∧ ) refinement
operators for the proponent and the opponent, respectively. The binary functions
cs connect an action of a given type s ∈ S with an action of the opposite type s ∈
S. If we model the proponent as the attacker, then the set Bp (and respectively
Bo) consists of atomic attacks (and atomic countermeasures). Conventionally
p = o and o = p.
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Definition 1. ADTrees are closed terms over the signature Σ = (S,F), gener-
ated by the following BNF-grammar, where bs ∈ Bp ∪ Bo, and s ∈ S is the type
of players.
t :≡ bs | ∨s(t, . . . , t) | ∧s(t, . . . , t) | −→∧ (t, ..., t) | cs(t, t) (1)
Example 1. If we label the basic events of the ADTree in Figure 1 by bp0, b
p
1, b
p
2, b
p
3,
bp4, b
o
0, b
o
1, b
o
2, and b
o
3, respectively for Network scanning, Vulnerability scanning,
Use vulnerability Exploit, Password brute forcing, Execute dangerous commands,
IP randomization, Mutable network, patches development, and finally password
policy, then the resulting ADTerm of the ADTree is:
t =
−→∧ p
(
co
(
bp0,∨o
(
bo0, b
o
1
))
,∨p
(
∧p
(
co(bp1, b
o
2), b
p
2
)
, co(bp3, b
3
0)
)
, bp4
)
(2)
2.3 Continuous Time Markov Chains
Markov chains [13] are stochastic processes used to model system behavior where
probabilistic events are considered. They are called Markovian since the predic-
tions are made based only on the current state of the system, and not on any
previous state. A Markov process that transits from one state to another via an
exponential rate is called Continuous Time Markov Chain or CTMC.
Definition 2. A continuous time Markov chain is a tuple (S,G, pi), where:
– S is a finite disjoint set of states,
– G : S × S → R is the infinitesimal generator matrix which gives the rate of
transition between two states s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S,
– pi : S → [0, 1] is the initial probability distribution on S.
The proposed semantics for ADTree requires to differentiate between the initial
state, intermediate states, and the final states. Therefore, we slightly modify
Definition 2 and adapt it to our needs. The new explicit notation (Definition 3)
will help us to easily formalize and define our semantics. Moreover, the initial
distribution pi is usually devoted to the initial state of the system. Therefore,
we omit the variable pi from the definition, since we arbitrary devote the entire
initial distribution to the initial state.
Definition 3. An enumerated continuous time Markov chain M is a tuple (S, S0,
S∗, G), where:
– S is a finite disjoint set of states,
– S0 ⊂ S is a finite set of initial states,
– S∗ ⊂ S is a finite set of final states,
– G : S × S → R is the infinitesimal generator matrix which gives the rate of
transition between two states s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S.
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We note that there exists a set of intermediate states that we denote by
Smid ⊂ S, where S = S0 ∪ Smid ∪ S∗, and S0 ∩ Smid ∩ S∗ = ∅.
The infinitesimal generator matrix G defines the exponential rates gs,s′ of the
transitions that go from one state s ∈ S to an other state s′ ∈ S. The element
gs,s of the infinitesimal generator matrix G are chosen such that each row of the
matrix sums to zero. Therefore, the generator matrix G is built as follows:
G =
{
−∑s6=s′ gs,s′ if s = s′,
gs,s′ otherwise.
(3)
Here, each gs,s′ ≥ 0 represents the exponential rate of transition from state s ∈ S
to state s′ ∈ S. The inverse 1/gs,s′ represents the average time needed to transit
from s ∈ S to s′ ∈ S and |1/gs,s| is the average amount of time (sojourn time)
spent in state s ∈ S. Furthermore, for a given state s ∈ S, if ∀s′ ∈ S, s′ 6= s,
G(s, s′) = 0, then state s ∈ S is called an absorbing state and M a continuous
time absorbing Markov chain.
3 Markov Chain Semantics for Attack-Defense Trees
We now define the semantics for ADTrees in terms of CTMC. In particular, we
first define the semantics for basic events bs ∈ Bp∪Bo, followed by the semantics
for the three refinement operators (∨sk)k∈N, (∧sk)k∈N and (−→∧ sk)k∈N, where s ∈ S,
and finally the semantics for counteractions cs(see Section 2.2). We then use
the semantics of these ADTree components to compose a single CTMC that
represents the semantics of the complete ADTree.
Semantics for basic events. Consider a set M of all possible CTMCs. We
can then define a function Ψ : B → M that associates, for each basic event
bs ∈ Bp ∪ Bo, a CTMC defined as ({s0, s∗}, {s0}, {s∗}, Gbs), where s0 and s∗
are the initial and final states, respectively. The element Gb
s
represents the
infinitesimal generator to the CTMC. It is computed using equation 3, and
hence given by equation 4:
Gb
s
=
[−λbs λbs
0 0
]
(4)
Figures 2-a and 2-b, illustrate the CTMC corresponding to basic events bp ∈
Bp and bo ∈ Bo, respectively. The rates λbp and µbo represent the exponential
rates of an atomic attack and an atomic countermeasure, respectively.
Semantics for conjunctive refinements. We define an unranked function
∧k∈N : Mk → M which takes k Markov chains and composes them in a way
that all k Markov chains should be executed in an irrelevant execution order.
Therefore, the composed Markov chain is (
∏k
i=1 S
bi ,
∏k
i=1 S
bi
0 ,
∏k
i=1 S
bi∗ , G
∧sk∈N).
The set S∧
s
k∈N contains all possible combinations of the states of the k involved
Markov chains. The initial state is equal to (sb10 , s
b2
0 , ..., s
bk
0 ), and similarly, the
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Fig. 2. CTMC-Semantics of basic events, refinements, and countermeasures.
final state is (sb1∗ , s
b2∗ , ..., s
bk∗ ). The remaining states refer to intermediate (tran-
sitive) states.
Figure 2-c illustrates the CTMC obtained by applying the function ∧s2 on
CTMC Ms1 and M
s
2 , where M
s
1 and M
s
2 are two CTMCs corresponding to two
basic events bs1, b
s
2 ∈ B. The generator G∧
s
k∈N is obtained by the following equa-
tion:
G
−→∧sk∈N(si, sj) =

−∑i 6=j G∧sk∈N(si, sj) if i = j,
0 if i 6= j ∧ |si∆sj | > 2,
0 if si ∈ Ω,
Gidf (Sidf ∩ si, Sidf ∩ sj) otherwise.
(5)
Where ∆ is the symmetric difference between two sets, |S| is the cardinality of
a given set S, Ω is the set of absorbing states, and idf = ϑ(si ∩ sj) is a func-
tion which returns the identifier of the Markov chains from where the input sets
belong to. For example, ϑ(s10, s
2
5, s
2
8) returns {1, 2}. In summary, this formula-
tion consists in identifying which transition (tidfi ) is linking state si to state sj .
Note that this formulation is valid for sequential conjunction and disjunction
refinement as well.
Semantics for sequential conjunctive refinements. We define the sequen-
tial conjunction refinements using the function
−→∧ k∈N : Mk → Mwhich takes k
CTMCs as input and composes them sequentially. The final state of the nth
CTMC is merged with the initial state of the n + 1th CTMC. Figure 2-d illus-
trates how two CTMCs are composed by
−→∧ s2. The result of −→∧ k∈N composition
is a CTMC (S
−→∧sk∈N , S
−→∧sk∈N
0 , S
−→∧sk∈N∗ , G
−→∧ssk∈N)where:
– S
−→∧sk∈N = S
−→∧sk∈N
0
⋃
S
−→∧sk∈N∗
⋃
S
−→∧sk∈N
mid
– S
−→∧sk∈N
0 =
∏k
i=1 S
bi
0
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– S
−→∧sk∈N∗ =
∏k
i=1 S
bi∗
– S
−→∧sk∈N
mid =
⋃k−1
i=1 S
bi∗ × Sbi+10
⋃
Sbimid × Sbi+10
⋃
Sbi∗ × Sbi+1mid
The set S
−→∧sk∈N is composed of the initial state S
−→∧sk∈N
0 ={(sb10 , sb20 , ..., sbk0 )}, the
final state {(sb1∗ , sb2∗ , ..., sbk∗ )}, and the intermediate states of Smid, which is com-
posed of intermediate states of the k involved Markov chains plus the linking
states
⋃k−1
i=1 S
bi∗ × Sbi+10 (chains each CTMC with the next CTMC).
Semantics for disjunction refinement. We define a disjunctive refinement
using an unranked function ∨k∈N : Mk → M, which takes k CTMCs as input
and composes them in a way that each CTMC can evolve independently to the
other CTMCs. Therefore, there will be k final states (one from each k involved
CTMC). The result of composing k CTMCs by means of a disjunction refinement
is (S∨
s
k∈N , S
∨sk∈N
0 , S
∨sk∈N∗ , G∨
s
k∈N), where:
– S∨
s
k∈N = S
∨sk∈N
0 ∪ S∨
s
k∈N∗ ∪ S∨
s
k∈N
mid ,
– S
∨sk∈N
0 =
∏k
i=1 S
bi
0 ,
– S
∨sk∈N∗ =
n⋃
i=1
Sbi∗ ×
∏
j 6=i S
bj
0 ,
– S
∨sk∈N
mid =
n⋃
i=1
Sbimid ×
∏
j 6=i S
bj
0 .
The set S∨
s
k∈N is composed of the initial state (sb10 , s
b2
0 , ..., s
bk
0 ), the intermediate
states of Smid, and the final states {(sb1∗ , sb20 , ..., sbk0 ), (sb10 , sb2∗ , ..., sbk0 ), ..., (sb10 , sb20 ,
..., sbk∗ )}, . The set Smid is composed of intermediate states of the k involved
CTMCs. Figure 2-e illustrates how two CTMCs are disjunctively composed.
Semantics for countermeasures. We represent counter-measuring with an
unranked function cs(bp, bo), where s ∈ S, bp ∈ Bp and bo ∈ Bo. If we consider
the proponent to be the attacker and the opponent to be the defender, this
function will link the atomic attack bp ∈ Bp with an atomic defense bo ∈ Bo.
Note that besides taking as inputs atomic attacks/defenses, the function cs can
also take as inputs conjunctively, disjunctively or sequential conjunctive refined
inputs.
The CTMC-semantics for a countermeasure is characterized using a new
unranked function cs : M×M→M. This new function takes two CTMCs Ms and
Ms as inputs, one representing the proponent action, and the second representing
the opponent action. It links them such that they counter each other. In other
words, the final state of the proponent action will be the initial state of the
opponent action and vice-versa. Therefore, if the proponent starts his next step
before the opponent action is executed, the proponent would skip successfully
the countermeasure set by the opponent. However, if the countermeasures is
successfully executed (before the proponent manages to move to next step), the
proponent is brought to the initial state where he has to re-perform his action.
For example, in Figure 1, if the password changing policy is executed the attacker
has to re-perform the brute force attack again.
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The constructed CTMC for counter-measuring is defined as follows:
– Sc(M
s,Ms) = S
c(Ms,Ms)
0 ∪ Sc(M
s,Ms)
mid ∪ Sc(M
s,Ms)
∗ ,
– S
c(Ms,Ms)
0 = S
Ms
0 × (sM
s
1 , s
Ms
2 , ..., s
Ms
|SMs∗ |
) where sM
s
i ∈ SM
s
∗ and i ∈
{1, ..., |SMs∗ |},
– S
c(Ms,Ms)
∗ = Ss∗ × SM
s
0 ,
– S
c(Ms,Ms)
mid = S
Ms
mid × SM
s
0 ∪ SM
s
mid.
Similarly to the other semantics, the set Sc(M
s,s) is composed of the initial state,
which contains the initial state of player (proponent/opponent) s and a tuple
of all final states of player (opponent/proponent) s. The final state consists
of the final states of the player (proponent/opponent) and the initial state of
player (opponent/proponent) s. It also contains intermediate states from each
player’s chain. Figure 2-f shows how counter-measuring of an atomic attack with
an exponential rate λ is performed against an atomic countermeasure with an
exponential rate µ.
We have formulated the generator matrix Gc(M
s,Ms) as follows:
Gc(M
s,Ms)(si, sj) =
{
−∑i6=j Qc(Ms,Ms)(si, sj) if i = j,∑
GM
s
(si′ , sj′) +
∑
GM
s
(si′′ , sj′′) otherwise.
(6)
Where (si′ , sj′), (si′′ , sj′′) ∈ si × sj and ϑ(si′) = ϑ(sj′) and ϑ(si′′) = ϑ(sj′′).
Overall, this formulation consists in summing the rates of all possible transi-
tions that go from state si to state sj . Since every transition t
idf
i belongs to only
one CTMC Midf , the execution of t
idf
i will only affect states of Midf . Therefore,
there will generally be only one transition (one rate), unless it regards a disjunc-
tion of countermeasures, where the rates of the involved countermeasures are
summed.
λbp0
λbo0 + λbo1
λbp2
λbp3
λbp1
λbo2
λbo3
λbp2 λb
p
5
λbp1
λbp4 λb
p
5
λbo2
Fig. 3. CTMC obtained by composing individual CTMCs for the ADTree in Figure 1
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Example 2. We use the ADTerm given by Equation 2 (section 2.2) and apply
the new semantics described above to obtain the entire CTMC (see Figure 3)
representing the whole ADTree of Figure 1. This is merely achieved by first
building CTMCs of basic events, then composing them according to the involved
refinements operators that links the basic events.
4 Quantitative Security Assessment
In this section, we show how to perform quantitative analysis using Markov
chains [18]. We show how to compute and extract matrices that are necessary
for the analysis. To achieve this, we consider an enumerated continuous time
Markov chain M = (S, S0, S∗, G), from which we can extract and compute the
following structures:
The first structure is called the instantaneous probability matrix P (t). It
gives the instantaneous probability to transit from a state si to state sj . In an
other words, for each state si ∈ S in a CTMC M , is associated a cumulative
distribution function 0 ≤ FX(t) ≤ 1 (where X is a random variable and t
is the time) that describes the probability of being in state si ∈ S, in time
interval [0−t), starting from state sj ∈ S. The instantaneous probability matrix
is computed using the infinitesimal generator matrix G as P (t) = eG.t.
Application. We exploit this matrix to draw the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of each final state (representing the final goal) starting from the
initial state. Therefore, we can compute at any time the probability of success
for each possible attack scenario leading to a final state (final goal).
The second structure is the mean probability transition matrix P , where
each element P i6=ji,j is equal to |gij/gii| for i 6= j, and gives the mean probability
to transit from state si to state sj . The elements Pi,i however, are null. In an
absorbing CTMC, this matrix particularly takes a canonical form defined as:
P =
[
Q R
0 Id
]
(7)
Here Id is the identity matrix, and 0 is the null matrix. We exploit the submatrix
Q to compute the fundamental matrix N , using: N = (1 − Q)−1, where each
element ni,j in the fundamental matrix N gives the expected number of steps
the process visited a state sj starting from state si. The sum of the i
th row in
matrix N represents the expected number of steps performed to reach any of
the absorbing state starting from state si.
Application. Knowing for each scenario, the set of visited states, we can
use the fundamental matrix N , to compute the amount of steps performed in
each scenario and hence determine the most/less probable scenario, or exert a
ranking for the different possible scenarios.
The third component is the absorbency frequency matrix B = N ×R, where
each element bij of B gives the probability of getting absorbed by each absorbing
states.
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Application. This matrix will serve to identify the most probable goal if we
have many, or to confirm again the most probable scenario and with which steady
state probability.
Finally, using the fundamental Matrix N and the sojourn times |1/gii| of each
state, we can compute the mean time required to reach the final goal starting
from the initial state.
Application. In the context of security modeling, we compute the MTTSF
(Mean Time To Security Failure) also known as MTTB (Mean Time To Breach)
or MTTA (Mean Time To Attack). We can also compute the mean time for each
scenario. The MTTSF is given by:
MTTSF =
∑
i∈Xt
n0,i × 1|gii| (8)
Where n0,i is the expected number of steps performed to go from the initial state
s0 to state si.
5 Security assessment of the networked system
We report on the analysis conducted to evaluate the security of the scenario
discussed in Section 2.1. In particular, we consider the ADTree in Figure 1 and
its CTMC representation in Figure 3 to perform security assessment. To achieve
this, we go through three cases: one (case 1), where we don’t consider existence
of countermeasures (attack trees), the second (case 2) we add countermeasure
‘prevent target identification’, and the last case (case 3), in addition to the
the previously added countermeasure we add two more countermeasures respec-
tively ‘Frequent patches’ and ‘Passwords policy’. The results of our analysis can
be used by security engineers to choose appropriate defenses in order to harden
the security of the system. For the purpose of performing quantitative analysis,
we have arbitrarily affected rational values for the different exponential rate of
each basic event. Therefore, by denoting atomic attack as bp0 . . . b
p
5 and coun-
termeasures as bo0 and b
o
3. We assign exponential rates λ as follows: λbp0 = 1 for
bp0=Network scanning, λbp1 = 2 for b
p
1=Vulnerability scanning, λbp2 = 1 for b
p
2=Use
vulnerability exploit, λbp5 = 5 for b
p
5=Execute malicious scripts. The atomic at-
tack bp3=Password brute force attack use an Erlang distribution Erl(2, 3), which
corresponds to a sequence of two exponentials of rate λbp3 = 3. Therefore, we
model this attack with two atomic attacks bp3 and b
p
4 of the same rate equal
to 3. The countermeasures bo0=IP address randomization, b
o
1=Mutable network,
bo2=Updates, and b
o
3=Password policy are modeled using exponential distribu-
tions µbo0 = 1, µbo1 = 2, µbo2 = 1, and µbo3 = 1, respectively. A point that we
should highlight, is that the fact of having sub-goals disjunctively refined, and
at least one of the refinements is conjunctively refined, induces the replication of
the final goal in the constructed Markov chain (see the two black states in Fig-
ure 3). Therefore, there will be more than one state referencing to the same final
goal but reached through different scenarios. As shown in Figure 3, the first final
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Fig. 4. Cumulative Distribution Function of scenarios group
state is reached through [bp0; b
p
3; b
p
4; b
p
5]. However, the second final state is reached
through two different scenarios [bp0; b
p
2; b
p
1; b
p
5] or [b
p
0; b
p
1; b
p
2; b
p
5]. Therefore, we can
define for each final goal (final state) fi a group of scenarios Gi composed of the
same atomic attacks, but conducted in different order.
Probabilistic security attributes. We compute the probability of reaching
the final goal over time expressed in terms of CDF. We also try to determine the
probability of each group of scenarios, and draw the evolution of their probability
of success over time. We compute the most probable scenario and perform a
ranking for the possible scenarios. To achieve this, we first use the instantaneous
probability matrix to draw the CDF of each final goal fi. In our example of
study, we have determined two groups of scenarios G1 and G2.
From Figure 4, in the two first cases, we see that the group of scenarios G1
is instantaneously more probable than the group of scenarios G2. This means
that the scenarios of group G1 are more probable than scenarios of G2. However,
they both converge to the same steady state probability of 50%. We explain this
from the fact that in case 2, the countermeasure ‘prevent target identification’
is applied to an atomic attack which is common to both groups G1 and G2. In
other words, defense contributes in reducing the total probability of the goal
over time (the sum of all groups CDFs) as we can see in Figure 5. Nonetheless,
in case 3, we have put more countermeasures in a way to reduce the probability
of success for G1, and we can see that the instantaneous probability of reaching
the final goal through G1 has slightly reduced for t ≥ 3 time units to a point
where G2 becomes more probable.
In Figure 5, we can see the impact of the countermeasures on the probability
of succeeding the final goal. For instance, for a working time of [0-5] time units,
the attacker has a probability to succeed of 97% in the first case, 91% in the
second case, and finally 86% in the last case, which is more secure. Note that
the impact is slightly small since the rates that we have affected are too close to
the attacks rates.
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Then we use the fundamental matrix N to compute the expected number
of steps realized in each scenario of each group, and therefore determine the
most probable scenario MPS (we can rank scenarios). The results are depicted
in Figure 6, where we can see that the most probable scenario has the largest
amount of steps. In this case, scenario [bp0; b
p
3; b
p
4; b
p
5] is the most probable one.
Furthermore, the number of steps is increasing each time countermeasures are
added. We explain that from the fact that the attacker performs more steps since
the execution of a countermeasure forces the attacker to restart from his initial
state. Therefore, in each scenario, the number of expected steps is increased as
long as countermeasures are added. Moreover, we can rank the three scenarios
as follows: [bp0; b
p
3; b
p
4; b
p
5], then [b
p
0; b
p
1; b
p
2; b
p
5], and finally scenario [b
p
0; b
p
2; b
p
1; b
p
5].
Finally, we use the absorbency frequency matrix B to compute the percentage
in which the attacker succeed in reaching his final goal through a particular
scenario in the steady state, that is to say, when he is given enough time. This
will allow us to testify which group of scenarios is the most probable. The results
are shown in Figure 7 (left side).
The steady state probability is 50% for the first two cases, where no coun-
termeasures are applied, then when a common countermeasures is applied. The
third case shows that it is more probable to perform attacks through G2 than
trough G1, since this last one contains more countermeasures.
Time based attributes. Finally, we evaluate the mean time to breach the
system in terms of MTTSF. Therefore, we make use of equation (5) and compute
the MTTSF for the three cases. The results are illustrated in Figure 7 (right
side). We can see that the attacker is each time delayed as long as we add
countermeasures. Indeed, the countermeasure ‘prevent target identification’ has
delayed the attacker to spend 25.64% more time units than usual (initial case).
In the third case, the attacker has to spend 44.62% more time units compared
to the initial non-secure case.
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6 Conclusions
We presented a stochastic framework to perform quantitative analysis of ADTrees.
We started by defining a new semantics for ADTrees in terms of CTMCs, then
showed how to construct a final CTMC representing the entire ADTree. We then
applied the analytical approach of CTMC to perform quantitative analysis. We
finally demonstrated the usefulness of our solution by means of a simple but
realistic example study.
As part of our future work, we will extend our framework to model and
quantitatively assess complex security scenarios like social attacks. We will also
extend our framework in order to embed it within the ADTool [6, 8], which is a
free software tool for security modeling and quantitative analysis using ADTrees.
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